Why Canada Slept Pt 3
Thanks to Gerhard for getting these to me, and thanks to Dave for letting me post this series of essays entitled "Why Canada Slept" which originally were published in the back of Cerebus. I have kept the original formating and haven't edit it at all. If you rather read a MS Word document of it, here it is.
If you have't read the previous installment, here it is, or better yet, start at part 1.
essay
Why Canada Slept
Part III
“When Americans believe that their vital
interests are at stake and their security threatened, Canadians should have
sense enough to recognize that Washington is a superpower with global concerns
that are different from those of our small, weak nation.”
J.L. Granatstein
“Preston Manning has spoken about the
need to permit cross-party coalition building in Parliament—yet he is very
quick to caution that Canadians don’t want ‘American-style’ politics. But Canada is barely a functioning democracy
at all: Its governmental structure, if described objectively, is far more
similar to what we would expect in a corrupt African state with decades of
one-party rule…Despite Canada’s self-delusions, it is, quite simply, not a
serious country anymore. It is a
northern Puerto Rico with an EU sensibility.
Canada has no desire to be anything but the United Nations’ ambassador
to North America, talking about the need to keep the peace around the world but
doing nothing about it save for hosting countless academic conferences about
how terrible America is.”
Jonah Goldberg The
National Review 25 November 02
There is a long history of
cooperation between the Canadian and American military dating back to the First
World War when American air crews based in Canada fought German submarines off
Canada’s coast. During the Second World
War, the two countries signed an agreement that would allow troops from either
country to operate in both Canada and the United States in the event of an
emergency. It was also during the
Second World War that U.S. troops built the Alaskan Highway which runs through
Canada. Canadian and American troops
trained for battle together as part of a combined unit known as the “Devil’s
Brigade”. Canadian solders, wearing
U.S. uniforms fought alongside American troops during the invasion of the
Aleutian Islands in 1943, and many Canadian paratroops were trained on U.S.
soil. It does not require extensive
research to ascertain that there is a commonality of purpose which exists
between the militaries of both countries and which is reflected in the civilian
leadership in the United States—but not in the civilian leadership in Canada.
One
of the leading causes of this otherwise wholly inexplicable schism is the undue
influence which the province/quasi-nation of Quebec exerts upon the occupant of
the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office) out of deference to Quebec’s (equally undue,
in my view) perceived electoral “value” within this country (which I began to
address in the last installment of this series). The net effect of this
perceived leading cause is that
Canada has been governed for the better part of thirty-five years by Quebecois
politicians (Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien) all of whom have
made the feeding of Quebec’s nigh insatiable appetites and gluttonous demands
for political, social and economic appeasement a centerpiece of their
respective tenures. In this, my country
metaphorically resembles nothing so much as a Bad Marriage in which the
shrewish, inept and materialistic Wife (Quebec) is fundamentally dissatisfied
with every aspect of her union (including the very idea of the union itself)
save one: that the union is able to provide her inept self with an infinitely
higher standard of living than she could ever imagine—even in the wildest
extremities of her feverish imagination— achieving on her own. So severe is the psychosis into which the
Wife has descended as a result of being caught between the rock of her own
materialism and the hard place of her loathing for the union in which she finds
herself that she has effectively dissociated into two separate
personalities. The first personality,
the Wife, is one big bundle of materialistic entitlements. As Canada’s official Wife she feels herself
entitled to a disproportionate share of the fruits of her much-despised union. In fact she feels herself entitled to
anything which is not nailed down Usque
Mare Ad Mare (“From Sea to Sea,” Canada’s Latin motto). In her Wifely view any government contract,
any barrel of Federal pork which does not land in Quebec has been taken out of
Quebec’s Wifely share of things. Were
the other inhabitants of the other nine provinces and three territories to
strip-mine their domestic resources and reduce their populace to sackcloth and
ashes and a bowl of thin gruel a day and FedEx everything else to Quebec City,
the materialistic Wifely personality which is Quebec would be convinced that
someone, somewhere was “holding out on her,” and would not rest until she found
out who and what and separated the latter from the former by tooth and
claw. In her other personality she is
the Ex-Wife, the Never-Was-A-Wife and/or the Soon-To-Be-Ex-Wife (he, she and
it, if you will). In this personality
she maintains all the trappings of a Divorcee, Virgin and/or Estranged
Wife. She has her own legislature, her
own flag, her own anthem and she insists that she be treated as a separate
entity from Husband Canada in all particulars wherever and whenever they appear
together as minor players on the international stage. The Husband Canada, being a great believer in “doing the right
thing”—believing in unity as an inherent good and worth whatever sacrifice is
required in order to maintain it—accepts the Wife’s hallucinations at face
value and actively keeps the marriage intact through ever larger incremental acts
and gestures of capitulation to her whims and through ever more docile
submission to her (let us call a spade a spade) blackmail.
[If my non-Canadian readers, at this
point, are (as one) thinking to themselves, “Dump the bitch.” I can assure you that—unlike my
left-liberal-quasi-socialist-hollowed-out-ventriloquist-puppet-husband fellow
citizens—I am in complete agreement. Considering that “the bitch” refuses even
to sign the marriage contract (the Canadian constitution repatriated from
Westminster twenty years ago), I
can’t imagine that it would be that difficult before whatever World Court the
proceedings might be conducted.
Judge:
Let me get this straight. You
refused to sign the marriage contract, and you’re here to claim alimony?]
This is, of course, nothing new in the
world of marriages, but it is as unsound a policy on the national level as it
is on a personal level. Husbands or
countries who keep their unions intact through just such acts of degradation
and who willingly submit themselves to these sorts of self-abasements achieve
only two ends. One, they make
themselves ridiculous in everyone’s eyes but their own and two, they end up
retreating, mentally, into a schizophrenic state founded entirely on fantasy as
the only defence mechanism available to them (however inadequate) against the
unacceptable reality in which they find themselves. Picture George and Martha in Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? and you have an apt analogy of the
state of relations between Canada and Quebec over the course of the last
century and the beginning of this one.
How did this state of degradation and
self-abasement come about? As with
actual marriages, such dissolution on a national scale was not the work of a
day.
My American readers who followed the
recent events at the UN—as the United States sought support for its resolution
mandating Iraqi cooperation with the terms imposed upon that country in 1991 by
the UN itself—would have gotten a taste of that “Bad Marriage” quality in the
actions of France as one of the permanent, veto-wielding members of the
Security Council. At one level, there
was communication…of a kind…going
on. The American ambassador and his
staff, Secretary of State Colin Powell and whomever else were involved in the
negotiations to keep France from vetoing the American resolution were obviously
talking and exchanging letters. Their
conversation and letters would have consisted of words and phrases which have
universally agreed-upon meanings. There
is a foundational assumption in such negotiations that there exists a level of
good faith that a resolution—an agreement—is possible and is being sought by
all of the parties engaged in seeking it.
But the problem, of course—that was faced by the Americans and which is
faced on a daily basis by Canadians—is that the French, wherever they are
found, do not function in that way. At
all. Their goal is never to reach a
resolution or an agreement. The goal of
the French is to impede progress by whatever means is possible, however
unlikely or ill-founded. You have an
agreement with the French one day and the next day you don’t. No earthly reason apart from the fact that
it was possible for them to impede you and therefore they did. It is what the French do. Whomever it was that granted them status as
a permanent veto-wielding member of the Security Council would, I hope, be
writhing in the innermost concentric ring of Hell for his perfidy. Of course, in the current go-round, once the
French had impeded the Americans every way that they possibly could by manufacturing
an opposing viewpoint out of the intellectual and philosophical matériel which is always the first
French preference—gossamer and pixy
dust—and having exhausted all available supplies of those so that everyone on
the Security Council was, finally, allowed
to vote, the vote was, of course, a unanimous 15-0. No veto wielded, no abstentions.
Even Syria voted for the
motion. In the days leading up to the
vote—as happens in journalistic proximity to anything in which the French
participate—all was dire gossamer forecasts and “fate hanging in the balance”
pixy dust. It would be a “squeaker,” a
photo finish. It was, of course, a
cakewalk. The French did everything
they could to get in the way and stay in the way. And then voted for the
resolution. And everyone was—as
Canadians are, on a nearly daily basis, with our Bad French Marriage and our Bad
French Prime Minister—left wondering:
“What
the f--- was that all about?”
And the answer is always the
same. “That” was about the French. In anything where the French are involved it
will always be about the French. Not in the way that Americans dominate the on-going international political and
cultural dialogue. The American
domination is a natural one, having as its foundation the inescapable success
of the American experiment. American
democracy works better than anyone
else’s. Americans have, as a result,
greater freedom, greater material prosperity, a stronger military, a more
vibrant economy and the only consistent global
success in arts and entertainment and consumer goods worth mentioning and
more success in any category that you care to name than does any nation. In any environment where one entity is that disproportionately
successful and by such a wide margin, that entity will—as America does—dominate
everyone’s attention and, simultaneously, attract admiration, jealousy,
affection, envy, resentment, loyalty and animosity and dominate the on-going
international dialogue with its collective and individual ideas, political
philosophies and thoughts. By contrast,
whenever and wherever the French—intermittently—show
up on everyone’s radar screen it is not because of French ideas, French
political philosophy, French thought. They
haven’t got any. Modern French ideas, French political
philosophy and French thought—oxymorons all—are to the on-going international political
and cultural dialogue of the global community what a five-pound bag of sugar is
to the internal combustion engine. I
suspect that the largest motivation behind France’s compulsion to impede
everything and everyone has its origins in the success of the American
experiment. America is, after all, an English-speaking country. England brought forth America on the North
American continent—the “shining city on the hill”. France brought forth Quebec, a parochial backwater whose contribution
to the world is poutine, french fries
covered in cheese and gravy.
You think you find that appalling.
Imagine how culinary France feels about it.
But, to return to the subject at hand,
“Why Canada Slept” can be attributed in no small part to Canada’s on-going Bad
Marriage to French Canada and to the French predisposition both to being irritated and to actively working
to irritate others, to being an impediment and to impeding others as a way of life. After several centuries of dealing with the
intransigent, unreasonable and unreasoning living French Impediment, a malaise
has taken root in English Canada on a national scale which is not dissimilar to
clinical depression. Just as the victim
of clinical depression finds sanctuary in excessive sleep, so, in my view, did
much of English Canada some decades ago enter into a somnambulant state so as
to avoid not only dealing with
Quebec, but to avoid having to even think
about Quebec for extended periods of time (this condition has not, to say the
least, been alleviated by the development of the acronym “ROC”—the “Rest of
Canada”—as a shorthand definition for those parts of this country which are not Quebec. “Do you live in Quebec?” “No, I live in the Rest of
Canada.”). As with any bad marriage,
the bad marriage colours all facets of an individual’s life. Those at the greatest remove from the bad marriage—children
who no longer have to live in the battleground which a bad marriage home
inevitably becomes, as an example—are the least susceptible to the clinical
depression which results.
I would put Canada’s military in this
category.
Shunned by its mother, Quebec, and nurtured by its father, Canada,
the Canadian military has, as a consequence, “grown up” since Confederation in
the well-adjusted and disciplined fashion of military men everywhere, eager to
participate both in international conflicts and international peacekeeping as
the defense of liberty and democracy and as the over-turning of despotism and
dictatorship require and capable of interacting with admirable effectiveness—in
both roles—with its military counterparts of other countries. Implicitly understanding that its sole
purpose is to discharge its obligations under the direction of the appropriate
civilian authorities, the Canadian military, like the military of all free
nations does not initiate its tasks, it discharges them where and when it is
directed to do so. And it accepts that
there may be extended periods where no task is put to it. In those times, its task is to maintain
itself at or near its peak efficiencies and capabilities through rigorous
discipline, military exercises and maneuvers.
So long as the highest civilian
authority, the Prime Minister, came from Canada, this remained the status quo. Beginning in 1968, however, when our Prime
Ministers (as part of the Husbandly campaign of Wifely appeasement) began to be
chosen exclusively from Quebec—and when the tenures of non-Quebecois Prime Ministers (Joe Clark, John Turner) could be
measured, literally, in mere months the Psycho Bitch quality endemic to the
Wife took hold and she soon set about the gleeful, decades-long dismantling of
the Canadian military piece by piece, a unilateral disarmament unprecedented in
any of the great democracies, before or since.
This concludes the lengthy detour which
began mid-way through part two.
Resuming Mark Proudman’s encapsulation of Canada’s military history with
the post-war years:
Primary concern with the home audience remained the focus of military
policy after the Second World War. In
the 1956 Suez War, Britain and France invaded Egypt to seize the Suez Canal,
which, in their opinion, they owned.
Lester Pearson’s famous negotiations for a ceasefire and a UN
peacekeeping force caused the government political difficulties: many English
Canadians, following the lead of The
Globe and Mail [Canada’s only national newspaper at the time], thought the British action had been justified.
It became politic for the government to be seen doing something
positive, so Canadian troops were deployed, not because they were necessary on
the ground (the Egyptians didn’t want them) but because they were necessary to
Ottawa’s image.
But Pearson had inadvertently discovered something: Peacekeeping is cheap. Moreover it has an enlightened,
internationalist, humanitarian air to it—a message that became particularly
appealing as the Americans got bogged down in Vietnam. Few troops are needed for peacekeeping so conscription is unnecessary [emphasis mine]. Cheap
and even out-of-date equipment is often good enough to get the job done. Canadian diplomats and politicians, from
Pearson to Chrétien, have been able to be seen playing a prominent role on the
world stage, without having to commit large forces or take great risks.
In short, what Lester Pearson recognized
was that it was possible to have a Canadian military which saw action
internationally so long as the scale of the operation was kept both small
enough—thus eliminating the
politically-hazardous need to conscript troops from Quebec which would trigger
riots in Montreal and Quebec City—and (this is critical) cheap enough that the Wife (Quebec) didn’t begrudge the Husband
(Canada) the money—which, above a certain dollar threshold, the Wife would have
insisted go towards some more worthwhile purpose: like a massive bribe or
blackmail payment to Quebec.
Peacekeeping is a “hot button issue” in
Canada—since, as with ice hockey, we claim to have invented it—and a news item
about its origins invariably sets off a flurry of corrections and
counter-corrections in Canadian newspapers.
By example, here is a “mid-flurry” letter from Sean Maloney of the Royal
Military College of Canada to the National
Post from July of this year:
I suggest that the historical record is more complex than Alex Morrison
asserts (re: letter to the editor, Pearson and Peacekeeping, July 12).
As
with any historical event, new information emerges over time and
interpretations of the past evolve. The
role of Lester B. Pearson in the development of UN peacekeeping is now at that
stage, particularly since the Orwellian manipulation of Pearson and his
policies by those seeking to further their own interests in the 1990s, which is
today a dangerous thing not only for this country but also for the soldiers we
send overseas.
My book does not dispute Pearson’s importance in the development of
Canadian national security policy during the Cold War. As Geoffrey Pearson quite correctly points
out, (Son defends Pearson’s Peacekeeping Legacy, July 12), Pearson was a strong
believer in deterrence. Furthermore, I
suggest in Canada and UN Peacekeeping
that Canadian peacekeeping, as
conceptualized by Pearson, was an integral, but not central component of
Canada’s strategy to contain Soviet totalitarianism. Many would have us believe otherwise, particularly those seeking
to portray Canada as a neutral nation.
There were other contributors to the creation of UN peacekeeping, men
who were perhaps not politically correct enough for those seeking to create
mythological personages that corresponded to their objectives. One of these men was General E.L.M. Burns,
the military head of the UN peace observation force in the Middle East, who
insisted in November 1955 that the UN needed a more robust armed presence
interposed between the belligerents.
Another was General Charles Foulkes and his staff officers, who
conceptualized Canadian UN peacekeeping in a 1947 study. A 1954 analysis by Pearson’s staff at
External Affairs concluded that peacekeeping operations were a means to
forestall Communist expansion in the Third World. Credit must be given where credit is due. I fail to see how this somehow detracts from
Pearson’s accomplishments.
I would suggest to those critics striking out blindly in defence of
Pearson that they carefully consider the argument made in the book before
condemning it.
The fact that Lester Pearson was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in the Suez Crisis, of course weighs
heavily in the balance when it comes to “who did” or “who did not” invent
peacekeeping. And, as Mr. Maloney
points out, the urge to create mythological personages rather than to research
the historical sequence of events is something of a vice on the left-liberal
side of things and Lester Pearson has, in many ways, suffered the same fate as
his American patron John F. Kennedy (who supplied Pearson with modern pollsters
and modern polling techniques in a very Kennedyesque —and successful as
hell—“don’t get mad, get even” campaign to unseat Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker—Pearson’s predecessor at 24 Sussex Drive and a Kennedy nemesis—in
the Canadian federal election of 1963) of being cast as kindred spirits of and
by the “squishy” left liberal quasi-socialist neutralists of their respective
political parties, the Liberals and the Democrats.
Which is not to say that Pearson wasn’t
more than a little “squishy” both before and after he assumed the office of
Prime Minister (1963-1968). As Robert
Fulford pointed out in his column “Fantasy informs our foreign policy” (National Post 17 September):
When
NATO was formed, in the 1940s, the Canadians insisted that its charter provide
for economic and cultural as well as military co-operation. This never happened, but after 20 years
Pearson took to saying that Canada would lose interest if NATO “degenerated
into merely an old-fashioned military alliance.” [Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State in the Truman
administration and one of the architects of NATO] argued that NATO was in fact an old-fashioned military alliance,
against the Soviets and nothing else.
Pearson was trying to make Canada’s pro-West, anti-Soviet policy look
different from America’s which it wasn’t.
Pearson did nothing but wrap Canada-U.S. relations in confusion…Acheson
liked Canada, and collaborated with Lester B. Pearson in creating NATO, but he
had no illusions about the things that Canadians have illusions about, such as
peacekeeping. He noticed long ago
something that Michael Ignatieff precisely defined last fall in a CBC
broadcast: a tendency among Canadian politicians and civil servants to “make a
specialty of impotent moral perfectionism”…Acheson summarized Canada’s approach
to diplomacy: As a middle-sized power,
Canada was listened to but not held responsible for results; it could attract
admiration while letting powerful countries be blamed for any failures. And how
did Canada use its middle-power position?
To posture as the world’s peacekeeper.
Acheson’s wry bemusement at Pearson’s striking
of attitudes and at the diplomatic antics of Canada, the “Stern Daughter of the
Voice of God” (I just had to work that in again) gave way to a
less…light-hearted…reaction in April of 1965 when Prime Minister Pearson
delivered a speech at Philadelphia’s Temple University in which he suggested
that the U.S. stop bombing North Vietnam.
During a visit later to Camp David, President Johnson was seen grabbing
the Prime Minister by the lapels.
“You don’t come here to piss on my
rug,” Johnson was reported saying.
Mark Proudman’s article “Undermining
allies a Canadian tradition” effectively addresses several inaccuracies in the
Myths of Suez by documenting the sequence of events.
Differing
national experiences have led to differing histories of the Suez affair. The
Europeans see it as an episode in the decline of empire. The Americans are inclined to view Suez
against the backdrop of the Cold War, and see the brief war as a
counterproductive allied distraction.
Canadians, however, have turned an allied disaster into a national
triumph: In that variety of heritage-moment history that comes at us from movie
screens, school textbooks and political platforms, we are told that during the
Suez crisis Lester B. Pearson who was secretary of state for External Affairs
at the time, invented the idea of peacekeeping and was able, through UN
diplomacy, to negotiate a ceasefire.
There is enough truth here to make a comforting national myth. The fact is Pearson negotiated an
ignominious withdrawal by British and French forces—and the affair then turned
into an unabashed triumph for the radical Arab nationalist dictator of Egypt,
Gamal Abdul Nasser, even though his forces had been defeated on the
battlefield.
The key issue in the Suez crisis was the Egyptian nationalization of the
Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and the French. The British and the French arranged for the
Israelis to invade Egypt, and then pretended to intervene to protect the canal
and to separate the combatants.
This was the kind of underhanded diplomatic trick that might have worked
in the 19th century, but this time no one was fooled and it rapidly became
apparent that even many Britons were offended by the disingenuous use of
military force to protect an economic interest. Democracies are bad liars:
A forthright declaration that “we are protecting our property” would
probably have rallied a great part of the British public behind the invasion.
The U.S. administration of President Eisenhower was particularly
incensed by the Anglo-French action.
This was, in part, because it was trying to convince Arab opinion that
the United States was just as staunchly anti-colonialist as the Soviets and
partly because it was simultaneously trying to rally world opinion against the
Soviet invasion of Hungary. Finally,
the United States was angry because America’s allies had kept it in the dark
about their plans and had the additional temerity to launch an invasion the
weekend before the 1956 presidential election.
The Americans responded to the
Suez invasion by organizing a run on the British pound and by co-operating with
the Saudis in an anti-British oil embargo.
This was the first oil embargo in history and it taught the Arabs a
dangerous lesson: Oil can be a powerful weapon. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles later gave up in
frustration his attempt to establish good relations with Nasser, and privately
apologized to the British for undermining them in 1956.
The Suez peacekeeping mission organized by Pearson was also the first
time Canada disagreed with Britain on the international stage. The reasons that the British agreed to
Pearson’s peace plan had more to do with money and oil than with anything that
Pearson did.
The Americans at least had the good grace not to build a national
ideology on disagreements with their allies; Canadians, on the other hand, seem
to have made inter-allied backstabbing something of a national tradition: Our politicians and diplomats are never
quite convinced that they are acting independently unless they are undermining
an ally.
That, I feel safe in saying, is the
French in us.
I think it also worth noting that the
Nobel Committee has always favoured leftist sentiments and causes and that a
major reason for the awarding of the peace prize to Lester Pearson likely had
more to do with the fact that he had been instrumental in Britain and France
ending up with egg on their faces and Egypt coming up a winner in the Suez
Crisis than for any “peace”—per se—which had resulted from his innovations.
18 July of this year, the National Post printed a letter from
Arthur E. Blanchette, a former peacekeeper and Indochina desk officer in
External Affairs:
[Pearson’s] influence on an earlier peacekeeping exercise is almost completely
forgotten today. For in 1954, along
with Paul Martin Sr., then minister of national health and welfare, he
persuaded a reluctant prime minister, Louis St. Laurent [from Quebec, I
hasten to point out], to accept the
invitation extended by the then-premier of China, Chou En-lai, that Canada join
India and Poland to monitor a truce and supervise a peacekeeping operation, set
up by the Geneva Conference of 1954, enabling France to withdraw from Indochina
without too great a loss of face.
Canada remained in Indochina until 1973.
Lester Pearson was also the individual
responsible for collapsing the branches of the Canadian military into a single
entity with a single chain of command called the Canadian Armed Forces, which
has proven something of a morale destroyer in Canada’s military (from what I
understand) undermining the natural pride which results from being in the Army,
the Air Force OR the Navy, as opposed to the ArmyAirForceandNavy. I suspect that this was accomplished largely
to allow the slashing of funding from a single
military budget rather than to attempt to slash funding from three military budgets (in much the way
that the Liberals recently slashed transfer payments to the provinces by
collapsing three programs into one and giving the provinces discretion as to
what and on which they might choose to spend the—drastically diminished—lump
sum which remained).
Abiding by the foundational rules governing
the military in a democracy, whatever the senior command of Canadian Forces
actually thought of peacekeeping (not
much, since they viewed it as a distraction from their primary responsibility,
fighting wars), they set about restructuring for the task at hand as determined
by the civilian authorities and, from 1956 onward, Canada’s military was
primarily used in UN peacekeeping operations.
In fact, the Canadian military, by the end of 2001, had sacrificed more
soldiers in the cause of UN peacekeeping than had the military of any other
nation, 108 soldiers on 70 different missions (all of whom were recognized by
the UN earlier this year with the Dag Hammarskjold Medal, named for the Swedish
UN Secretary-General who died in a plane crash while on a peace mission in 1961
in the Congo).
In my view, this conversion of the
Canadian Forces from a combat force
to a peacekeeping force became
another reason “Why Canada Slept”.
Through the efforts of Lester Pearson and his Liberal and Quebecois
successors—whose motives were primarily
the avoidance of conscripting soldiers and secondarily
the slashing of military spending to the bare bone (both of which had as their overarching motive the appeasement of
public opinion in Quebec)—we, essentially, backed
into our status as a pacifist or neutralist nation, by taking it as a given
that a peacekeeping army could be smaller—substantially smaller—than a combat force. This then made not only possible,
but inevitable the leap of left
liberal, quasi-socialist faith from that “given” to holding as self-evident the
view that we would never have need of
combat forces. The succession of Quebecois Prime Ministers
which followed Lester Pearson—with their innate antipathy towards all things
military—made the disgraceful erosion of our armed forces inevitable. At the time of the Suez Crisis, the Canadian
military consisted of 120,000 combat-ready soldiers. As mentioned in part one
of this series, that number is down around 50,000. Taking into account the number of military personnel which are
required to maintain the Canadian Forces Bases around the country and overseas,
the deployable forces are
substantially fewer even than that.
Perhaps as few as 9,000.
As Major General Lewis Mackenzie, the UN
Commander in Sarajevo in 1992 put it in his not altogether facetious “Dear President
Bush” letter (“Mr. Bush, help us be all
that we can be” National Post 24
September):
Dear President Bush,
I hope you don’t mind me writing you like this. Trust me, I wouldn’t be so brazen if the
situation up here were not so serious.
By way of background, in 1992 I had the good fortune to serve as the UN
Commander in Sarajevo when your father was president, Vice-President Cheney
held the office of Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State Powell was
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thanks
to the excellent relationship that existed at the time between Prime Minister
Mulroney and President Bush (41), your father’s public promise—that the United
States would respond to threats to our security in Bosnia if the UN was
incapable of doing so—was a great boost to our morale.
During that period in the early ‘90s, Canada’s military was punching
well above its weight on the world stage.
With less than 1% of the world’s population and a deployable army of
just over 20,000 we made up over 10% of the UN’s peace operations around the
globe. With 2,000 soldiers in Bosnia
and Croatia, 500 in Cyprus, 400-plus in Cambodia and more than 1,000 in
Somalia, and hundreds on smaller missions in the Middle East, Haiti and Central
America, plus a combat-ready brigade of more than 4,000 with NATO forces in
Germany, I could look Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Powell in the
eyes when I met with them following my departure from Sarajevo in 1992. Canada was doing “more with less” than any
other army in the world—and we were damn proud of our contribution to
international peace and security.
During the past nine years the Canadian Armed Forces has borne the
largest brunt of our government’s assault on the nation’s deficit. Twenty-five per cent was removed from a
budget that might have been adequate to maintain a minimum acceptable
capability in a stable world, but was woefully inadequate to cope with a
multitude of deployments in the latter half of the 1990s to trouble spots like
East Timor, the Congo, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Georgia, Kosovo,
Eritrea/Ethiopia etc., etc.
The fact that our Army is bankrupt and can no longer respond “ready aye
ready” to whatever its government demands was driven home just a few months ago
when we were forced to withdraw our modest army contribution—fewer than 900
fine soldiers—from the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Our only major army deployment currently
left outside the country is a 1,000-plus contingent in Bosnia with NATO. Its re-supply system is civilian-run and
could not be deployed into a war-fighting situation—such as Afghanistan or
wherever the pursuit of the terrorists takes us.
In spite of the dramatic cutbacks to our operational deployments, the
Army is more than $1-billion in the hole on its operational budget. The modest increases cautiously anticipated
in future military funding wouldn’t even pay the Army’s outstanding debt, let
alone stop the hemorrhaging of experienced people from its ranks.
You might be surprised to learn that this grievous situation has been
well recognized by the majority of elected representatives within our House of
Commons and our appointed Senators as well.
Both groups have produced compelling and justified arguments for increased
defence funding totaling 50% over the next four years. The government’s own Auditor-General has
eloquently made the case for similar increases and highly qualified think-tanks
from coast to coast, many with absolutely no self-serving reasons other than
patriotism and concern for our nation’s military, have forcefully expressed
similar recommendations. Finally, and
by no means least in importance and weight, your own ambassador to our country
has been tough and articulate in expressing your country’s concerns regarding
the deteriorating state of our military’s operational capability.
Considering all of the above, I was merely wondering…would you be
prepared to make an annual donation (I doubt if the idea of a loan would float)
to our defence budget? The amount suggested
is relatively modest—all Canadian dollars—say $1.5-billion the first year
(preferably starting this year so we can pay a few bills), increasing by
$1.5-billion each year for the next five years, culminating in 2006 with a
steady state grant of $7-billion. My
calculations indicate that your total “grant”—in our dollars, over five
years—would only buy you seven B2 bombers at home, whereas the same investment
north of your border would buy you—well, not really you, because you know how
sensitive we are about our sovereignty—would buy us a
75,000-strong fighting force unequalled in the world for that modest an
investment. If anyone knows how to
ingeniously get the biggest bang for your buck it’s the Canadian Army (with the
USMC in a close second place). With the
proven quality of our young men and women in uniform as collateral I can assure
you that you will not be disappointed—and your security and that of the world
will be enhanced.
Lewis MacKenzie, Major General (ret’d)
PS. Please don’t mention this correspondence to our Prime Minister. He might be less willing to accept the
donation if he knew I had asked you. Oh
yes, if you do decide to contribute please make sure you get a written
guarantee that the money will be spent on our military. There is a good deal of talk these days
about our departing Prime Minister’s legacy and I wouldn’t want to see your
largesse spent on a third lane for our TransCanada Highway.
This is not the usual tone of a military
man and certainly not the tone of a military man of Lewis MacKenzie’s
irrefutable high caliber, which, as the Major General says, gives you some idea
of how desperate the situation has become for Canada’s military.
* * * * * * * * *
Before moving on to look at the high standards
which the Canadian Forces continue to uphold against overwhelming
odds—including excerpts from Major General MacKenzie’s more representative
writings—I think it worth noting an interesting, if somewhat tangential conclusion
that I came to in the course of researching “Why Canada Slept”. That is, that the relationship between the
United States and Canada is directly analogous to the relationship between
Canada and Quebec. I think it worth
noting because it seems to me that Canadians could improve their relationship
with the United States if they would realize just how…Quebec-like…our behaviour towards our nearest neighbour, closest
ally and largest trading partner is. It
grates on the Canadian nerves to listen to Quebec always harping on its sovereignty,
its small-mindedness in always emphasizing its independence, its fundamental
differences from the “Rest of Canada”.
Being polite Canadians we try to give the Quebecois a sympathetic
hearing but it is very, very difficult.
“How do you see yourselves as
being different?” Apart from being
French the answer always consists of vague parochial interests which separate
the Quebecois from us only because their interests are peculiar. Not peculiar in a bad way. Just peculiar. As in “how can anyone find that as interesting as you do?” Which is rather, I think, the American
reaction to our treating ice hockey as a religion. They don’t think its evil, they
just think its…peculiar (which it is).
And their reaction is not “Oh, well—no wonder you think you’re not like us.” When Americans listen to the parochial interests which most
Canadians believe separate them from Americans, their reaction is about the
same as our reaction to the parochial interests of the Quebecois which make them think of themselves as a breed apart.
An honest Canadian reaction to
Quebec and an honest American
reaction to Canada would be, “Don’t you think that’s kind of, well, petty?
Kind of small-minded? I mean,
aren’t you making a mountain out of a molehill?” This is never said, either by Canadians to the Quebecois or by
Americans to Canadians for the obvious reason that it would only compound the
problem. If you think someone is being
petty and small-minded, accusing them of it is the surest way to find out just
how petty and small-minded someone can be.
Implicit in both cases is, “You are aware that you would be completely
lost-at-sea without us, right?” Canada
is the United States’ largest trading partner, but not nearly to the extent
that the United States is Canada’s
largest trading partner. It’s amusing
every time we have the same trade dispute over softwood lumber. The Americans claim that Canada unfairly
subsidizes its softwood lumber. Canada
claims it does no such thing. The
Americans slap a whopping tariff on our softwood lumber. Our softwood lumber industry instantly goes
in the toilet. We send the dispute to
arbitration at the World Trade Organization.
They agree with Canada. The
Americans lift their tariff. Not once
does Canada look at the situation and say, the softwood lumber industry goes in
the toilet because the Americans are our
only customer. What? Are you going to float a bunch of logs
across the Pacific Ocean to Japan?
Across the Atlantic to Spain? Those will be mighty expensive logs when
they get there (if they get
there).
Not treating the softwood lumber industry
under those rules by which your Biggest and Virtually Only Customer wants it to
be treated (listen to me carefully, Canadians) Is. A. Very. Very. Quebec. Like.
Thing. To. Do. It is exactly the sort
of petty, nickel-and-dime, in your face, nyah nyah, “I’m kicking you in the
shins, I’m kicking you in the shins” sort of thing that Quebec always tries to
pull with the Rest of Canada. Which
always makes the Rest of Canada go, “What’s the matter with those idiots? Don’t they realize they’d be lost at sea
without us?” They can’t just be what
they are: a part of Canada, they have
to have “sovereignty association” or something so everyone knows how special
and different they are. And they can’t
just say, “We’re sovereignly
associated.” So Canada can say, “Fine.
You’re sovereignly associated. Good for
you.” And then go and do something
interesting. No they have to have some
big hooplah conference and weeks of negotiations and referenda and polls and
debates where they’re the centre of
attention and Canada offers them the sun and the moon and the stars and a
weekend in the Bahamas if they will just please sign the Constitution. At which point they petulantly say “no” just to prove how special and different
they are.
I’m sure there is a Freudian
term—transference, maybe?—which defines the behaviour of a Husband who has so
completely and thoroughly self-abased and humiliated himself in capitulating to
the every whim of the Wife in his Bad Marriage that he then starts turning all
of the relationships in his life into equally Bad Marriages by taking on the
worst traits of his Wife. Whatever that
term would be, it suits Canada to a “t” and nowhere more thoroughly than in its
relationship with the United States. We
will have “outgrown our long national adolescence” (in Mark Proudman’s
memorable phrase) only when we recognize how Quebec-like we have become and stop being that way. We should be as unquestioningly loyal to
the United States as we believe Quebec should be to Canada and for the same
reasons: one, because it is the right
thing to do and two, because it is the wise
thing to do given that the United States is as critically necessary to the
success and to the survival of Canada as Canada is to the success and the
survival of Quebec.
This concludes my digressional lecture
series, Grow.Up.101.
* * * * * * *
I agree with Charles Krauthammer’s
observation from his column earlier this year (“U.S. military makes war—not peace”)
where he advocates that the U.S. hold firm in leaving peacekeeping duties to
others. “Why? Because the U.S. military is the world’s premier fighting force,
and ought to husband its resources for just that. Anybody can peacekeep [sic]; no one [else] can do what Americans
did in Afghanistan. Many nations can do
police work; only Americans can drop thousand-pound bombs with the precision of
a medieval archer.” For Canada, put
another way, there is no use crying over spilt milk. If there existed any misapprehension at the External Affairs
ministry back in 1956 that the switch from combat forces to a peacekeeping role
would still leave Canada with all its options on the table, it has been
thoroughly repudiated by events in Afghanistan. The quest for the “military high ground” did not end with the
development of the atomic bomb. Nuclear
weapons do represent an ultimate “trump card”.
What was overlooked by every nation besides the United States and the
Soviet Union (the latter, up until 1989) was that the competition for the
“military high ground” in conventional
armaments was still in doubt. Apart
from the Avro Arrow, the state of the art fighter jet which Canada developed in
the early 1960s—and which was scuttled before it could advance beyond the prototype
stage—Canada opted out of the competition early and completely. It is not a game where you can take a seat
on the sidelines and then play “catch-up” decades later when geopolitical
realities take a sharp turn in an unexpected direction (as they did on 11
September 2001). The development of
state-of-the-art military hardware is a scaffold where each new piece-or-system
builds on the strength of its immediate predecessor piece-or-system while
simultaneously diminishing or eliminating apparent or potential weaknesses. The Pentagon’s scaffold is now as tall as
the former World Trade Center buildings and everyone else is stuck somewhere
around the tenth or twelfth floor. To
the civilian mind this seems like “overdoing” it, but, arguably, the greater a
technological “lead” the Pentagon can open up over any potential rivals, the
more secure the technology becomes from espionage or the loss of sophisticated military
hardware in combat. If your adversaries
open up a downed military jet and are unable to understand what they are
looking at, they will be unable to imitate it.
In the 21st century, that technological “lead” is as close as you can
get to holding the “military high ground,” a quest as old as warfare itself.
Given Canada’s lack of military capability,
this makes it even more necessary, in my view, for Canada to define its
military role relative to the perceived requirements of the United States—both
as America’s closest neighbour and largest trading partner and as a NATO ally. Unfortunately, in my view, the present
Liberal government has elected to define Canada, instead, as a member of the
United Nations which strikes me as seriously screwy given that the UN (as Ezra
Levant pointed out in “Why Canada should declare war” National Post 15 August) “…was conceived as a meeting place for
nations’ diplomats, a clearing house for national interests. It has no democratic mandate or legitimacy
of its own. If Mr. Graham [Bill Graham,
Canada’s current Foreign Minister] feels that a certain UN vote is also in
Canada’s national interest, then that is a happy coincidence. If our interests are not the same, then
Canada’s sovereignty—especially over a declaration of war, the gravest decision
a government can make—must trump Mr. Graham’s utopian adherence to the latest
diplomatic fad. Section 91 (7) of Canada’s Constitution grants sole
jurisdiction for the ‘Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence’ to the
Canadian government. Our Constitution
makes no mention of the United Nations.”
Even from the highly skewed Liberal perspective of “UN Uber Alles,” the UN General Assembly votes on motions before it.
Member nations are expected to hold a view—yes or no—and to vote
accordingly. Taken to its ridiculous
extreme, allowing the UN to set the course of Canadian foreign policy would
require that Canada’s ambassador vote last on any declaration so that he or she
could vote with the majority view, whatever that happened to be. It would be the equivalent of a U.S. Senator
saying, “I’ll go along with whatever the Senate decides”. It brings a new level of “squishiness” to
the left-liberal, quasi-socialist way of doing things. Which should come as no great surprise to
those of us who have been subject to the Chrétien Liberals for the better part
of a decade, whose dictatorial approach to parliamentary democracy has led to
such spectacles as the government voting unanimously
against one of its own 1993 campaign promises contained in its (in pace requiescat Mao Tse Tung) Red
Book when it was put forward as an opposition motion by the Canadian
Alliance.
Although I am advocating just such a
knee-jerk support response—substituting the United States for the UN—I think
that that is the only honourable and sensible course of action left open to my
country, given that (as I pointed out in the first installment) we put all of
our eggs in the ‘War is Over” basket.
In a world where fundamentalist Islam has surged to the forefront of all
our consciousnesses with the events of 11 September, with the bombing in Bali,
with the Miss World riots in Nigeria, with the suicide bombings in the Middle
East such that no democracy can now consider itself safe from attacks upon its
civilian populations, Canada is no longer
theoretically beholden to the United
States for its national defence, it is beholden to the United States in practical
fact. It is a fact of fundamentalist Islam that the number and severity
of its attacks diminish in direct proportion to the amount of lethal force
brought to bear against it. It was the
decisive action in Afghanistan, the no-nonsense approach to the prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay and the immediate “gearing up” for an invasion of Iraq which has
left the United States largely free from (the Beltway Sniper aside) domestic
and overseas Muslim terrorist attacks—and certainly nothing on the scale of 11
September. There seems a strong
likelihood that rogue Islamic elements are now more apt to target the “skinny
puppies” of the Western “litter,” in which category Canada has chosen to be the
“skinniest of the skinny”. There was a
chilling quality (completely lost on the government of my country) when—in the
aftermath of the Islamic terrorist attack on the French oil tanker off Yemen—the
Pentagon announced that it had no plans to tighten security over the shipping
lanes in the area. Given France’s
checkered track record as an American ally, a sensible approach on the part of
the United States and one which I think would be equally sensible—and very
possibly forthcoming—in the event of a terrorist attack on Canada, its
territories or its citizens.
It is the sheer precariousness
of Canada’s situation, having unilaterally disarmed in a now more dangerous
world, that contributes a great deal to “Why Canada Slept” and why Canada
continues to sleep, in my view. Even as
the other western democracies have begun an overhaul of their respective military
capabilities in response to the events of 11 September and the terrorist
activities of fundamentalist Muslims around the world, Canada chooses to do
nothing. Not “very little”. Nothing.
There is no shortage of proposals out
there. Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey,
Canada’s top army commander, in his blueprint, Army of Tomorrow has proposed a ten-year overhaul that would
transform an army built to fight Cold War mechanized battles in Europe into a
nimble force that can be deployed quickly in small, messy peacekeeping,
peacemaking and anti-terrorist operations in theatres such as Bosnia, Somalia,
Kosovo and Afghanistan. As the National Post editorialized about
Lieutenant-General Jeffrey’s proposals (“Raising our military IQ” 13 May):
The focus on large formations of 1,000 or more men would disappear and
smaller 100-man units with special-forces training would become central. More resources would be directed into
surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations.
By contrast, the present situation of “Why
Canada Slept” and through which Canada’s present government continues to sleep
was addressed by Matthew Fisher in “The fact is, Canada has little to bring to
a war” (National Post 7 Sept.):
The
global war on terror demonstrated with embarrassing clarity the Canadian navy
cannot support more than three warships at a time in distant seas. The war in Afghanistan revealed Canada has
little military airlift and no military sealift, and no longer has enough
combat doctors to staff a field hospital.
Afghanistan also showed that a country that sent hundreds of thousands
of fighting men to Europe during the Second World War cannot now sustain a
1,000-man battle group in the field for more than six months.
Addressing the peculiar schism between the
civilian authorities in Canada on the one hand and the Canadian military,
American military and American civilian authorities on the other hand, Mr.
Fisher notes:
The (Canadian) army brass was keen to dispatch Leopard
tanks from its base in Germany to help expel the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait in
the winter of 1990-91, but after furious political debate that plan was vetoed
by [External Affairs minister] Joe
Clark and other doves in the [Prime Minister Brian] Mulroney cabinet.
What George Bush Sr. got from Canada then were a few warships, a supply
ship, a military field hospital, a Boeing 707 tanker aircraft, several C-130
Hercules transport aircraft and a squadron of F-18 fighters.
However those warplanes spent most of the war quietly flying combat air
patrols against Saddam’s invisible air force because Ottawa would not authorize
pilots to drop bombs until the last hours of a campaign that lasted weeks.
Given this, the state of our complete
lack of military preparedness, and given that there is no sign on the horizon
that the present government of Canada is prepared to even begin to address this sorry state of affairs with anything besides
massive infusions of gossamer and pixy dust, and given (most particularly) that
this leaves us almost entirely dependent on the United States for our defence,
then I think the only honourable course of action is to supply the United
States with the last international resource of even marginal value which we
possess: our support at the UN before the world community and support—if not in, then, at least, of the war on terrorism. It
might prove a source of meager consolation to Canadians that we had at last found a valid use for our gossamer and pixy dust which,
at essence, represents the totality of our contributions—both actual and
potential—because there is no question or doubt (in my mind, anyway) that the
United States can quite successfully “go it alone”. Whether you are discussing Canada’s Leopard tanks or Canada’s Coyote
armoured vehicles, there is not the remotest chance of their “tipping the
balance” in favour of the U.S. led forces in any conflict with Iraq (or with
those dictatorships which will be targeted after Iraq). They will be virtually unnoticeable by their
presence or by their absence. Likewise
with our vote at the UN. The United
States has (quite legitimately, in my view) made it plain that it will work in
cooperation with the UN or it will work in cooperation with “like-minded”
nations. For the moment, the United
States is concerned, to one extent or another, with garnering international
support at the UN for its actions in rooting out terrorists and attacking those
states which sponsor terrorism.
Deciding between the democracy of the United States under George Bush
and the dictatorship of Iraq under Saddam Hussein should (to say the least) be
an international diplomacy no-brainer.
For everyone except Islamic terrorists and left-liberal,
quasi-socialists it is, in fact, a no-brainer.
But if, as allies of the United States, as member nations of the UN, as
NATO members, as democracies, we can’t bring ourselves to see the difference
between right and wrong, between black and white when it is before our eyes in
just so cut-and-dried a propositional dichotomy, we can’t be altogether
surprised (although I’m sure—when the time comes—we will pretend to be with all the usual left-liberal, quasi-socialist
histrionics we bring to bear on such occasions) when the United States abandons
even the façade of interest in what the international community might or might
not think of its actions and sets about the task of bringing freedom and
democracy to the enslaved nations of the world which are hungry for it with the
assistance of like-minded governments and their militaries. Nor can we be altogether surprised when
this becomes an irrevocable
circumstance: when we discover that American UN diplomacy exists only to
refute, to undermine and to discredit domestic opposition to government
policy. In the United States’ case:
left-liberal, quasi-socialist objections to doing
the right thing and taking action against
dictatorships and despotism. The larger
implication of this is that each time, in the aftermath of 11 September, that
the UN proves itself to be nothing more and nothing less than, well, the UN—proves
itself, in short, to be irretrievably…French…(for
want of a better term) in demonstrating its preference for obfuscation over
insight, misdirection over clarity, rhetoric over resolve and dilettantism over
decision-making—brings that much closer the complete discrediting of what has,
historically, been the UN’s own first line of defence as a functioning World
Body: American left-liberal, quasi-socialists. George Bush, simply by playing the UN game
by the rules, has demonstrated to the American public the levels of pointless
intricacy, the quantities of hot air and the time-wasting required to get the
UN to support its own resolutions. Each time that he submits his
administration’s foreign policy to the Rube Goldberg-like UN maze he makes it
that much less possible for Senate and House Democrats to resort to or to
invoke the UN as a serious entity without appearing, themselves, to be left-liberal,
quasi-socialist dupes blinded by gossamer and pixy dust. The left-liberal, quasi-socialists have been
quick to grasp the salient facts of How the World Has Changed post-11
September, but, at the same time, seem unable to retain those facts for extended
periods. “You are either with the
United States or you are with the terrorists” is a good example, as is, “Our
target is those nations which finance or harbour terrorists.” It’s common sense. Of course there is nothing that qualifies as common sense
that—once the left liberal, quasi-socialists get a hold of it—they are not able
to “on the other hand” into a kaleidoscope of myriad and daunting complexities
which breed in turn still more “on the other hand” intricacies until there is
nothing visible but billions upon billions of “other hands” and no idea even
where “square one” is, let alone how to get there. Common sense would tell you that “square one” is where you begin. Common sense would tell you that “square one”
is where you are starting from. It is a
mark of how divorced left-liberal, quasi-socialism is from reality that even defining “square one” would—for
left-liberal, quasi-socialists—constitute the basis of a profoundly divisive
debate.
Andrew Coyne in his column “Which precedent? What law?” (National Post 7 October) eloquently
defines the box in which the left-liberal, quasi-socialists of the Chrétien
government now find themselves as Foreign Affairs Minister Graham seeks to
chart a Liberal course through the 21st century’s suddenly illiberal political waters.
In recent days, Mr. Graham has made his most detailed public critiques
yet of American policy. His concerns
are three-fold. One, there is not
sufficient evidence that Saddam Hussein poses an imminent threat to the United
States or its allies. Two, lacking such
evidence, the United States could not invoke its right of self-defence in
international law to attack Saddam unilaterally, i.e. all by itself. “Article 51 of the UN Charter,” he said on
CBC radio last week, “allows a state to take action in self-defence. It doesn’t allow you to invade somebody just
because you want to invade them.”
Rather, three, any decision to use force against Iraq should be taken by
resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Graham has pledged to “work with the Americans to push them
in the direction of multilateralism instead of unilateralism.”
But that is to misstate the situation.
The United States is not proposing to act alone, but in concert with its
allies. The choice is not between
multilateralism and unilateralism, but between two different kinds of
multilateralism: On the one hand, an ad
hoc “coalition of the willing,” including Britain, Australia, Spain, Italy and
several Arab states, and on the other, the institutions and practices of the
United Nations.
Which form of multilateralism you prefer will depend on which task you
expect it perform. Is it to prevent
rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons?
Or is it to constrain the exercise of American power? It’s no use saying both. As a practical matter, the choice of one
effectively precludes the other. It was
only the threat of American action that roused the UN to enforce its own resolutions.
Left to itself, the UN would never
summon the will to confront Saddam.
So the question becomes, which is the greater threat to international
security: America or Iraq? For the
anti-American left, the answer is easy.
After all, as Linda McQuaig observed in The Toronto Star last
week, Saddam’s only invaded two countries, whereas the United States ‘has
invaded or assaulted, Grenada, Nicaragua, Libya, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan,
Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan…” (But why stop there? Why not add France to the list?
Also Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and other European nations
liberated in the Second World War—countries that, thanks to previous U.S.
“invasions,” are today democracies.)
That’s not Mr. Graham’s point, I think.
Rather his concern is what other
states might do. If international law were set aside in this
case, he argues, the precedent could be invoked by other countries to settle
disputes by military means. Indeed, he
reminded reporters on Friday, “our Russian colleagues are already speaking to
Georgia in respect of Chechnya in lines that are not substantially different
from that of the United States’ language in terms of Iraq.”
But again this misstates the situation.
The issue is not whether to allow a precedent to be set. A precedent will be set either way. Either we will decide that a state
threatened by weapons of mass destruction, whether in the hands of rogue states
or their terrorist clients, is entitled to protect its citizens, without
waiting for the bomb to go off. Or we
will decide that legalistic concerns for national sovereignty will take
priority over threats to the peace.
In any event, it is not precedent that determines whether countries will
invade their neighbours, but calculations of national interest. If Russia is given license to invade
Georgia, it is far more likely to be as a result of a backroom deal to obtain
its consent for an attack on Iraq.
Whereas a United States that acted “alone” could still make clear that
attacking Georgia was unacceptable to it, and to the international community.
Which is what international law amounts to: an informal, evolving sense
of what the world will accept, and what it will not. Those who insist on the sanctity of international law appear to
believe it to be analogous to domestic law, as drafted and enforced by domestic
governments. Such is not the case. There is no Parliament to draft it, no
legitimate government to enforce it.
Certainly the UN is not that government. Its delegates are neither elected nor answerable, in most cases,
to anyone who is. The notion that the
United States, or any nation, should have to subject the security of its
citizens to a veto by the likes of Russia, or China, or France, is an
absurdity. Yet that seems to be what
Mr. Graham has in mind.
.
No matter how simple and self-evident is
the “common sense” choice before them (the democratic government of the United
States under George Bush versus the totalitarian government of Iraq under
Saddam Hussein being a good example) what is most difficult for left liberal,
quasi-socialists—the governments that they form and the supporters that they
attract—is choosing. They jealously guard their “right to
choose” while expending vast amounts of energy and time manufacturing tangential
and largely irrelevant complexities.
The left liberal quasi-socialist sees this endless postponement of
decision-making, this endless multiplying of “on the other hands” as inherently
wise and as hallmarks of a fine intellect.
Conversely they view those who are not
prone to manufacturing complexities out of gossamer and pixy dust as “morons”—as
our Prime Minister’s director of communications, Francie Ducros, described
President George W. Bush at the recent NATO summit which had as its theme, “How
to modernize NATO.” The President’s
view is that you modernize NATO by persuading the member nations to upgrade
their armed forces through increased military spending. The President graduated from Yale, but I
don’t imagine his Ivy League degree was required for him to understand that the
way that you modernize an international military alliance is by having the
member nations upgrade their armed forces through increased military spending. After years of meetings and sub-committee
meetings and debates, after much hand-wringing, both in and with the media and
after the generation of several metric tons of written reports (examining root
causes and the psychological stresses created by military alliances, women’s
issues as they pertain to military alliances, the role of gays in military
alliances) in their own timorous fashion (and only after you had assured them
they would be allowed to change their minds), even left liberal quasi-socialist
“morons” would arrive at the same conclusion:
The way that you modernize an international military alliance is by
persuading member nations to upgrade their armed forces through increased
military spending.
Next: A “made in Canada” solution: More Lewis MacKenzie and less Francie
Ducros.